THE LANCE’S POINT
The
Japanese operational concept at the start of the Pacific War was to establish a
defensive perimeter of naval and air bases and then to use air and surface
forces to wear down any advancing Allied force. In pursuit of this concept, the Japanese resolved in early
1942 to build an airfield on Guadalcanal -- an island in the southeastern
Solomon chain. An airfield there
would expand the Japanese defensive perimeter in the South Pacific, cramp the
supply routes from the US to Australia, and extend the Japanese
intelligence-gathering network. After
the destruction of much of the Japanese carrier strength at the Battle of
Midway, the Allied had the opportunity to take the initiative in the Pacific.
They took that initiative by invading Guadalcanal and taking over the
nearly completed Japanese airfield. The
landings went smoothly and the airfield was quickly captured, but the Japanese
response was violent and prolonged. The
campaign went on until February 1943, when the exhausted Japanese finally
evacuated the island. The
Guadalcanal campaign was ironic in that it stood the Japanese operational
concept on its head. By electing to
fight for Guadalcanal, the Japanese brought their forces into the range of
Allied airpower flying from the captured airfield. This was the opposite of the Japanese idea; instead of the
Allies being drawn into the range of Japanese aircraft, Japanese naval forces
were steaming into Allied air strikes. The
Allied air dominance meant that the Imperial Japanese Navy could only operate
off Guadalcanal at night. Then,
superior Japanese night-fighting skills reversed the margin of superiority that
the Allies enjoyed during the day. The
flip-flop resulted in a pattern that came to characterize the fighting in the
Solomons. During the day, Allied
naval forces resupplied and reinforced their troops.
At night, swift Japanese forces dashed down from Rabaul to resupply their
forces in turn. These forces became
known as the “Tokyo Express” and their route -- down the central channel of
the Solomons -- became the “Slot.” When
the Allies remained behind at night, fierce surface actions were fought.
When daylight caught the Japanese within air strike range of
Guadalcanal’s Henderson Field, American air power stung the Japanese surface
forces. The
results of the naval campaign reflect this pattern. In five major night surface actions, the Japanese accounted
for 60.000 tons of Allied ships. The
Allies sunk only 22,000 tons of Imperial Japanese Navy ships directly in night
actions, but Allied air power and long distances over which damaged Japanese
ships had to withdraw accounted for another 68,000 tons.
Thus did the Japanese abandon their own strategy, with disastrous
consequences. Note: For older scenarios, see the updated ship forms on the FOTW Ships page. These have been revised to include the gun tables on the forms, to make merchant ships easier to sink, and in other minor details. Savo Island -- The Japanese react to the Allied invasion of Guadalcanal. Tin Can Collision -- Opposing convoy escort forces collide. Cape Esperance -- An American force tries to stop a Japanese night bombardment mission. Naval Battle of Guadalcanal -- the Cruiser Action -- The Americans throw a cruiser force in the way of a powerful Japanese bombardment group. Naval
Battle of Guadalcanal -- the Clash of the Light Forces --
The US Navy commits two new battleships to the night actions fought off
Guadalcanal. Naval Battle of Guadalcanal -- the Capital Ships Engage -- In this second installment of the climactic naval battle off Guadalcanal, opposing big ships go into action. Tassafaronga Komandorski Islands -- The Japanese try to run a supply convoy into their Aleutian conquests against American resistance. |